Introduction
The concept of the "marketspace"introduced by Rayport and Sviokla's (1994) paper (unless otherwise indicated, the phrase "their paper" will refer to this article) is an intriguing one. Those who read it find it thought-provoking and challenging and the term "marketspace" is now being used with increasing frequency, not least by practitioners (see for example: Koch, 1995; Roth, 1996; Vincour, 1996) .However, attempting to "apply" the ideas in their paper presents considerable difficulties which arise from the fact that they:
• do not provide a definition of "marketspace"; • do not define three terms which are central to the discussion -these being content; context; and infrastructure; and, • while providing several examples, which while having the merit of being varied, incorporate so many factors as to make the interpretation of their "message" difficult. This paper will attempt to identify the crucial features of the concept of "marketspace" through a careful examination of the examples that their paper presents. Then, through considering an example from other sources, the validity of the interpretation being proposed will be "tested".
A synopsis of Rayport and Sviokla's paper
Although in Rayport and Sviokla's (1994) paper no definition of a marketspace is provided, in a later paper they state that a marketspace is: "a virtual realm where products and services exist as digital information and can be delivered through information based channels" (Rayport and Sviokla, 1995, p.75) . Their paper claims that a marketspace does three things: 1 makes possible, in the context of buyerseller transactions, the separation of content from context from infrastructure; 2 creates changes in the economics of product enhancement and/or product line extensions; and 3 enables some members of the value chain to manage their customer relationships more directly.
The challenge for managers is, they maintain:
to discover and act on new opportunities in the marketspace. This may not be an easy one. Learning to manage in marketspace requires a radical shift in thinking: from markets defined by physical place to ones defined by information space (p. 149).
Their paper contains seven examples which are used to illustrate how the introduction of information technologies (which include both the development of cheaper but more powerful computing power and data transmission) changed the nature of the buyerseller transactions. However, even careful reading of these, particularly because of the way they are integrated into the text, leaves considerable room for interpretation of their meaning. The following section therefore sets out the examples and, from the description in their paper, seeks to do two things with each. First it identifies the three elements of: content; context and infrastructure, both before and after the introduction of information technology. Second, it attempts to identify which parties gained value through the introduction of the new system. Both these analyses are based on no more than the personal interpretation of the author of this paper.
AUCNET
AUCNET is an electronic auction system which has replaced the traditional used car auctions in Japan, at which wholesalers sell cars to retailers. It is the clearest example in their paper of a marketspace replacing marketplace. The arrangement is that, instead of taking the cars they wish to auction to an auction place, sellers call AUCNET with a list of these cars. Then an AUCNET representative calls and inspects the vehicles and photographs them. This information is digitised and sent to those dealers who are members of the system on a laser disc. Every weekend an AUCNET staff member runs an auction on computer screens all over the country. The cars which are sold are then delivered to the buyer's premises. The effects of introducing this system have been that:
Retailers pay 6 to 7 per cent higher prices. Wholesalers get higher prices. Everybody saves travel time. Unnecessary physical movement of cars is reduced. AUCNET -a new firm -makes a good profit through "auction" charges; sale of information; and leasing of equipment.
However, it is not clear whether the number of traditional auctions fell; how the quality of car's description varies between AUCNET and that of a physical auction. Also unclear is the reaction of retailers to paying higher prices; whether retailers and wholesalers miss the lack of "social" contact which is part of attendance at an auction (British farmers are reputed to value attendance at auctions to the extent that they will attend even when not intending to trade!). However, from sources other than their paper, it is apparent that AUCNET is very profitable, achieving in 1993 an operating profit of $12 million on sales of $47 million while employing only 111 people (Hulme, 1994, p. 16) . Also, by 1994, about 20 per cent of Japan's used car dealers had joined the scheme and AUCNET was confident enough to have entered the US market and by 1994 was selling over 2,300 cars in each twiceweekly auction (Phalon, 1995, p. 12 ).
Summary
From their article it appears that a traditional system has been replaced by a new one which delivers essentially the same "product" but in a way which can only be done with new technology (see Table I ).
For whom does the system create value?
• Final consumers -possibly none as, if retailers pass on the higher prices, it is difficult to see what compensating benefits the consumer gets.
• Retailers -some saving on travel time; apparently more cars to choose from; and, depending on quality of inspection scheme, better cars. Against this must be set the loss of social contact and business "chat"; and higher prices, unless these can be passed on to the final customers.
• Wholesalers -saving on travel time and the costs of unnecessary transportation of vehicles; higher selling prices. Against this must be set the loss of social contact and business "chat".
• AUCNET -a new company making good profits.
Automated telling machines (ATMs)
ATMs were a new product which could only have existed once a certain level of information technology was available. Originally, as they were always inside a banking hall, they were simply a mechanised supplier of cash. Their development to the stage where it is now possible to learn what a balance "held" in, say, Oxford is and then draw cash from it at, say, 23.00 on a Saturday in Pennsylvania (i.e. 04.00 GMT Sunday) has been incremental.
The effects of ATMs' development have been: customers now have access 24 hours a day, more or less world-wide, to information about their bank accounts plus the ability to draw cash. ATMs have made it even more difficult for the banks to maintain their individual distinctiveness. Further proposed developments such as video links with customer services representatives seem unlikely to do more than improve the customer service offered as customers have become accustomed to being able to go to almost any ATM and get the complete service (see Table II ).
• Customers -24 hour access to cash and information world-wide. Ability to work with minimum balances.
• Banks -reduction in number of counter staff required. Against this has been the contribution that ATMs have made to further erosion of consumer loyalty.
• Infrastructure -increased volume. 
Voice mail
Voice mail was originally seen by many people as a service which replaced a product (i.e. the answering machine) but which has now extended the array of services beyond that offered, or indeed in several cases, that which could be offered by an answering machine. With voice mail, customers are freed from the requirement to maintain, have space taken up by, the need to remember to activate; etc. the answering machine.
They are also offered a number of features which are new, such as being told that a call has been recorded while they were using their phone (see Table III ) .
• Customer -extended user-friendly service. No need to worry about a physical facility. However, the charge over a number of years for using voice mail exceeds the cost of buying an answer phone.
• Telephone company -opportunity to sell a wide range of services at prices which are low -relative to the basic rental charges incurred by having a telephone line. These added services, by making the system more flexible, increase usage of the core product and increase overall revenue. Against this is the problem that capacity comes in "lumps".
Newspapers
Here their paper describes a development in the newspaper world which is arguably a new product and not a substitute product. This is the idea of accessing news on-line through, in their example, (AOL) America Online (see Table IV ).
• Newspaper reader -greater choice, greater ability to select what to read. Some extra costs.
• Newspaper management -none
• AOL -a new business, opportunities to offer a range of services to segments identified by readership.
• Infrastructure providers -extra volume.
Pacific Pride
Pacific Pride sells diesel fuel to truckers through a fuel distribution system using ATM-like machines enabling truckers to obtain fuel, much as a customer obtains cash from an ATM, at an attended or an unattended gasoline station. The vehicle owner receives regular fuel usage analyses in a format customised to their individual needs (see Table V ).
• Self-employed truckers -access on more sites; delayed payment (though probably no more than with credit cards).
• Fleet owners -their drivers have greater access to fuel; access to bulk fuel discounts; provision of fuel usage analyses in customised format.
• Pacific Pride -reduced credit loss; higher margins.
Time Warner Cable
In an experiment during 1993-1994 in Queens, New York, consumers were able to access, via cable, pay-for-view entertainment selections made by phone. Thus instead of going to a video shop and selecting a video, they could phone in their choice and have it "delivered" to their homes (see Table VI ).
• Viewer -no need to travel to store (time and security issues). Against this must be set problems of choice when a specific video is not required.
• Time Warner -opportunity to create brand loyalty to a wider range of products.
• Cable companies -increased volume.
Credit cards
Originally the use of credit cards required no IT capability but simply, for items over a specified value, a telephone link between the retailer and live operators. Currently the greater part of the use of credit cards utilises on-line electronic capabilities (see Table  VII ).
• Customer -convenience and instant access to credit world-wide.
• Shop, garage, etc. -less cash management (time and security issue); greater security than cheques.
• Credit card issuers -new businesses.
• Credit card systems -new businesses.
General comments
What then can be drawn out of this interpretation of their examples? The first point is that the examples range from those such as AUCNET (which are new ways of performing existing activities) through to those such as voice mail (which could not exist without the features which seem essential to the marketspace such IT, electronic networks, etc.). A subjective assessment of the innovativeness of the product as perceived by the consumer might be as follows:
Least innovative 
Most innovative
• Voice mail Without minimising the originality of the AUCNET concept, the application of new technology to an existing product is probably easier than where the hope is to exploit new technologies by creating a new product. Not least because the benefits can be explained, in terms of the world that they know, to those who will need to buy into it. In comparison, many people do not appreciate all the benefits which voice mail can provide until they have used it for a while. It is perhaps therefore not surprising that AUCNET comes across as their paper's clearest and most detailed example of what changing from a marketplace to a marketspace can mean.
A second issue is that the authors' rationale for certain classifications is not always clear. For example, why in the AUCNET case do they state that the product is "information" in marketspace but "car" in the marketplace? By comparison, in the case of Time Warner, the product in both marketplace and marketspace is said to be "the video". After all, even when using AUCNET, people are not ultimately purchasing a virtual car but one in which they can drive away! The authors' failure to clearly define some of their terms is further illustrated by the voice mail example, where it is difficult to determine whether the telephone network is Fourthly, the ability of marketspace significantly to change the cost/value balance, which they identify most explicitly in the voice mail example, is not so clearly developed in their other examples. The significance of the failure to do this is perhaps illustrated by the fact that when they assert that the video-on-demand enables Time Warner to manage the interface with its customers, they do not discuss why this has not been the case in the past. After all Time Warner could have set up a chain of video shops. Presumably part of the reason why they did not was cost, but another might have been the issue of the need to be able, if such shops were to attract sufficient business, to stock their competitors' products. Understanding of the marketspace approach would have been helped by knowing these factors and how the marketspace overcomes them.
A fifth issue implied by the authors is that one of the great strengths of the marketspace is it enables firms to disaggregate the three components: content; context; and infrastructure. However, as is suggested in the above paragraph, the Time Warner example shows that there is nothing new in this. While, at least as far as the customer perceives the situation, their statement that in marketplaces "(t)he three elements are usually aggregated" (p. 145) is probably correct, these elements are often disaggregated from the supply side. Indeed sub-contractors are frequently used (without the customer needing to be aware of this) to create part of the bundle of attributes that they are purchasing.
Finally, in their examples, the issue of who gains the most value needs to be explored in greater depth. This is particularly the case if they are correct in the stress they place on the importance of the change in the cost/value balance that is made possible by the marketspace.
Summary
Rayport and Sviokla's (1994) paper states that marketspaces: 1 make possible the disaggregation of content from context from infrastructure (p. 145); 2 create changes in the economics of product enhancement and/or product line extensions (p. 144); and 3 enable some members of the value chain to manage their customer relationships more directly (p. 147).
However, they do not argue that all three of these will be achieved in every case. Each of these features are also achievable by traditional marketplace activity -as examination of the examples shows -and is demonstrated in Table VIII , where their seven examples have been classified according to whether or not these three criteria applied to them before and after the new system came in.
However, if those which seem to be particularly enhanced by the use of information technologies are picked out then this points to "b" as the only one which is common to them all. What this implies is that, in all the examples in their paper, information technologies can cause changes in the economics of product enhancement and/or product line extensions. This change can occur at any stage in the creation of value, as their credit card example demonstrates, as the strategy of both American Express and Diners Club is to emphasise the context of their service while in comparison, that of MasterCard and also Visa is to emphasise their infrastructure. The crucial insight that their paper provides is then that marketspaces create the possibility of changes in the economics of product enhancement and/or product line extensions.
The Peapod case
This conclusion is lent support by examination of a case which is not in their paper. This is the activity of Peapod in the USA. Peapod is a home shopping service that provides 27,000, AUCNET y n n y y y Videos y n n y y y Pacific Pride y n n n y y AOL n n n y y ? Credit cards n n y y y y ATMs n n y y y y Voice mail y n n y y y Notes: y = the criterion applies; y = the criterion applies and has been enhanced by the use of IT; n = the criterion does not apply mostly high dual-income households in Boston, Chicago, Columbus, San Francisco, and San Jose with access to over 20,000 grocery items through an on-line service. Each household pays $4.95 a month to belong and pays $6.95 plus 5 per cent of the total order for each delivery. Members use software provided by Peapod to place orders by dialing up on their home PCs. The system provides them with a wide range of information including the nutritional value of each item; unit prices; special offers; suggested recipes; etc. Peapod employees based in local supermarkets (with the owner's agreement) then pick the goods and a home delivery is made within a 90 minute timespan specified by the customer. All the customers' actions are individually recorded by a central computer so that each household's purchases can be tracked in amazing detail. For example, the fact that a customer, after searching the ice cream lists does not initially make a purchase but switches to look at frozen yoghurts and then switches back to ice creams to make a purchase, will be recorded. The flexibility of the system is considerable and can be tailored to each household's requirements. For example, if requested, shopping lists for each customer based upon their shopping patterns can be provided. Also, if requested, reminders can be given. Thus, if a household which regularly buys diapers fails to do so, this can be brought to its attention.
Peapod is without doubt a superbly efficient home delivery service but that is not where its distinctiveness lies. It is in fact an information provider because through online technologies it is able to combine product and customer databases. The consequence is that although "Peapod may appear to be in the grocery business, actually it is in the business of maximising share-of-customer" (Cross, 1996, p. 20) .
Arguably, where Peapod will make money is not through the grocery delivery (the costs of home delivery must still be high even relative to an average grocery order of over $100) but through its ability to use the information created by the transaction to create changes in the economics of product enhancement and/or product line extensions. It can do this by making the customer databases (suitably aggregated to ensure that individual customers' privacy is protected) available to manufacturers, advertising agencies and market research agencies, for this information allows them to get close to "one-on-one marketing" (Rubel, 1996, p. 2) .
For example, Coca-Cola could be sold the information and then ask Peapod to target regular Coke drinkers with one type of promotion; regular Pepsi drinkers with a different one; households which appear to switch between Pepsi and Coke on the basis of price targeted with a third one; etc. The importance to a supplier of being able to do this is that the Peapod system effectively creates a laboratory in which to test the effect of such promotions as well as an opportunity to target the 27,000 existing customers.
Thus Peapod, by providing households with a value-added delivery service, is also able to use the information it simultaneously obtains about the households; their preferences; their shopping patterns; etc. to offer a value-adding service to manufacturers at almost zero marginal cost to Peapod. Thus the Peapod system is creating changes in the economics of product enhancement and/or product line extensions. Significantly though, Peapod is maintaining control of the database because it recognises that the act of disclosing information immediately reduces its value (Boisot, 1995, p. 11) . Peapod has thus recognised that the information, which is incidental to the service they set out to offer households, has become a product in its own right.
Conclusion
In the sequel to their 1994 paper, Rayport and Sviokla state, "The value chain model treats information as a supporting element of the value-adding process, not as a source of value itself " (Rayport and Sviokla, 1995, p. 76) and this is the key to understanding their concept of the marketspace.
In several of the cases cited in their paper, they showed how a company is either already exploiting (or has the potential to do so) the economics of information production which is that while collecting information may be expensive, its reproduction is inexpensive. In some cases, especially AUCNET, they have demonstrated that information technologies have done little more (though even this creates tremendous benefits for the parties involved) than automated an existing process.
Others of their examples show how the new technologies draw on the flow of information "to deliver value to customers in new ways" (p. 78). This is clearly correct in terms of their examples but misses the vital point demonstrated by Peapod. This is that Peapod has developed a significant additional value creating activity, not just for its original customer target group, but for other organisations such as the manufacturers, market researchers and advertising agencies.
The developments in information technologies have for many years been making possible the creation of greater efficiency in the supply
[ 89 ] of many goods and services. The current cumulative effects of the growth of computer capacity plus the increased speed and volume of transmission of data are making possible not just increased efficiencies but new ways of using information to create bases for competitive advantage. Firms need to constantly consider the information that their systems collect for the purpose of attaining this greater efficiency to determine to who else and in what form it would be of value. This is the challenge of the concept of the marketspace.
